The Republic of Heaven

I wonder if anyone here read John Gray's essay The Atheist Delusionhttp://books.guardian.co.uk/review/stor ... 95,00.html, published in last Sunday's The Guardian. He makes a detailed analysis of current atheist books, and includes a paragraph on Pullman:

As in the past, this is a type of atheism that mirrors the faith it rejects. Philip Pullman's Northern Lights - a subtly allusive, multilayered allegory, recently adapted into a Hollywood blockbuster, The Golden Compass - is a good example. Pullman's parable concerns far more than the dangers of authoritarianism. The issues it raises are essentially religious, and it is deeply indebted to the faith it attacks. Pullman has stated that his atheism was formed in the Anglican tradition, and there are many echoes of Milton and Blake in his work. His largest debt to this tradition is the notion of free will. The central thread of the story is the assertion of free will against faith. The young heroine Lyra Belacqua sets out to thwart the Magisterium - Pullman's metaphor for Christianity - because it aims to deprive humans of their ability to choose their own course in life, which she believes would destroy what is most human in them. But the idea of free will that informs liberal notions of personal autonomy is biblical in origin (think of the Genesis story). The belief that exercising free will is part of being human is a legacy of faith, and like most varieties of atheism today, Pullman's is a derivative of Christianity.

I wouldn't agree with most of his viewpoints, but I found it worth reading the essay. I plan to buy his book and put it side by side with Dawkin's and Pullman's.

I'd agree that free will is a legacy of the Abrahamic religions, but I wouldn't say that advocating free will in a story equates to Pullman being this type of deluded atheist. As he admitted in a recent interview with The Times, he writes for a large audience and I think a story without free will would struggle to capture our imaginations. I see it more as an atheist parable to wake people up from religious dogma that wouldn't otherwise have considered such ideas.

The article has a point though: the atheism in His Dark Materials is by no means one free from dogmatic ideas and taken too literally, only serves to move from Christianity to a form of secular humanism that promotes people as the pinnacle of evolution above other animals, whose quality of life (barring a catastrophe) will undoubtedly progress towards a utopian future. The building of The Republic of Heaven is a manifestation of this ideal, but human history offers little to support that Pullman's Republic of Heaven on Earth is any more attainable than a place in the Christian Kingdom of Heaven. Scientific and sociological development heave led to longer disease-free lives, but are these lives more free or more enriched than those of our ancestors? I think this is highly debatable and akin to the logic of missionaries enforcing Christianity on godless natives to "improve their lives" or "make them civilized." For as long as history has been documented, those who write it have a tendency to assume their views in their current socio-political climate to be the true, timeless, righteous ones, to look back on past times with pity for their ignorance - if only they could live now to see how things are supposed to be. We idolize the Romans for their contributions to civilization - a civilization that allowed taxation and control over people and land on a scale never before possible. What must that have seemed like to the people who had lived relatively free and unsupervised up until the arrival of the tax collectors? Other than the intervening dark ages, we've never got rid of those tax collectors and now we're completely dependent on them and society to look after us. Technological development has allowed us to extract more food and materials from the same resources and cram more people into cities than would have ever been possible in the ancient world, but is today's world of dwindling species and natural habitats really richer and improving on what was there before it?

Perhaps if they weren't so abrasive, Hitchens and Dawkins could productively challenge the specific religious practices and beliefs that foster the conditions they deplore. I'm afraid their current tack just pisses people off.

That said, I think Gray is no better. First, he repeatedly conflates science with teleology, a sophomoric mistake. Science has no normative dimension; it's a method that's strictly positive. Second, are Hitchens and Dawkins really so difficult to attack that one must distort their views to make straw men of them? I think not. Consider the following ridiculous argument, which is representative of Gray's entire essay:

He recognizes that, because humans have a universal tendency to religious belief, it must have had some evolutionary advantage, but today, he argues, it is perpetuated mainly through bad education. From a Darwinian standpoint, the crucial role Dawkins gives to education is puzzling. Human biology has not changed greatly over recorded history, and if religion is hardwired in the species, it is difficult to see how a different kind of education could alter this. Yet Dawkins seems convinced that if it were not inculcated in schools and families, religion would die out. This is a view that has more in common with a certain type of fundamentalist theology than with Darwinian theory, and I cannot help being reminded of the evangelical Christian who assured me that children reared in a chaste environment would grow up without illicit sexual impulses.

Of course religion isn't "hardwired in the species." That's not Dawkins' contention at all. Although there are genes that strongly correlate with religiosity, to assert that religion is therefore "hardwired in the species" is like suggesting Windows Vista is "hardwired" in the latest Dell desktops. Dawkins argues that religion is like a software virus; though it may boast reproductive advantages when abetted by compatible hardware it's counterproductive in every other meaningful respect. Gray's sexual analogy is utterly without merit.

Finally, Gray resorts to argumentum ad Hitlerum. When writing about any subject that's not substantively related to totalitarianism and/or genocide, any reference to Hitler or the Nazis diminishes one's entire argument. I allow that Hitchens and Dawkins are likewise culpable, but that's no excuse.
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Callum, your post is pretty sensible but I admit three reservations. (1) You accuse Pullman of falling into the teleology trap. Where did he write that the Republic of Heaven is inevitable? Where did he write that humans are the pinnacle of biological evolution, or that secular humanism is the pinnacle of cultural evolution? He may be guilty as charged, but I didn't get that impression from the books. I agree we didn't 'progress' to the current state of affairs any more than we 'progressed' in the biological sense. Argument from teleology leads one to compare the past and present in deterministic, normative terms that are indeed highly specious. (2) Accordingly, comparisons between extinct societies and present ones are exceedingly difficult to support. Context is everything. Each 'this is better' decision that one may consider a cultural departure can only be reliably judged in context. Changing conditions present new choices, none of which may be as 'good' as the ones that previously fell by the wayside. The choice today isn't whether or not secular humanism is better than Neolithic ethics, or whether or not it's the best normative system of all time. The question we face today is whether or not secular humanism is better than present alternatives under present conditions. The primeval forest is dead. If we reject secular humanism for its imperfections despite the inferiority of every practical alternative, we will have fallen victim to the Nirvana fallacy.

Bear in mind that subjectivity is inevitable when making this sort of determination. I concede I cannot prove that secular humanism is superior to the alternatives, but nevertheless believe that to be the case. Indeed, my detractors cannot be persuaded by positive science because the terms of the argument are strictly normative. Consider the Declaration of Independence. None of the truths contained therein are actually self-evident. They are held to be self-evident to reach a conclusion the authors approved. My appreciation for that conclusion may be subjective, but that doesn't mean I can't inspire others to arrive at the same conclusion by pointing their subjective analyses toward the benefits I perceive.

(3) Your point respecting taxation can be easily turned on its head.

Other than the intervening dark ages, we've never got rid of those tax collectors and now we're completely dependent on them and society to look after us.

From whom did the tax collectors derive their authority in Imperial Rome? From whom do they derive their authority today? The distinction you seem to draw between 'society' and 'us' is unsustainable in parallel with your historical argument.

Sorry for the long post, I'm bored at work.

Callum, your post is pretty sensible but I admit three reservations. (1) You accuse Pullman of falling into the teleology trap. Where did he write that the Republic of Heaven is inevitable? Where did he write that humans are the pinnacle of biological evolution, or that secular humanism is the pinnacle of cultural evolution? He may be guilty as charged, but I didn't get that impression from the books. I agree we didn't 'progress' to the current state of affairs any more than we 'progressed' in the biological sense. Argument from teleology leads one to compare the past and present in deterministic, normative terms that are indeed highly specious.

This was mostly laziness on my part; I didn't quite refine my arguments completely. I wasn't so much concerned that it was inevitable, but the idea that it was even achievable with enough time is something I would have serious doubts about. Human nature may preclude any such society being possible (the subtext I had in mind is that humans may even need some degree of suffering in their lives for spiritual enrichment and as such the elimination of all suffering may not be feasible or even desirable - the old cliché of people being happy for the mistakes and bad times in their lives for making them the people they are, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless mind yada yada) - sorry for not exploring the argument to its completion but I like generating questions and doubt more than refining my answers. As for the pinnacle, I meant it only in a relative sense when compared with other animals. He definitely portrayed Humans, Mulefa et al. as something special and better than grazers - those who attract Dust and those who don't - I find literally believing in such false divisions to be misguided, but it's OK as part of a story.

(2) Accordingly, comparisons between extinct societies and present ones are exceedingly difficult to support. Context is everything. Each 'this is better' decision that one may consider a cultural departure can only be reliably judged in context. Changing conditions present new choices, none of which may be as 'good' as the ones that previously fell by the wayside. The choice today isn't whether or not secular humanism is better than Neolithic ethics, or whether or not it's the best normative system of all time. The question we face today is whether or not secular humanism is better than present alternatives under present conditions. The primeval forest is dead. If we reject secular humanism for its imperfections despite the inferiority of every practical alternative, we will have fallen victim to the Nirvana fallacy.

I wasn't rejecting secular humanism, so much as the corrupted Star Trek brand of it that puts humanity on a pedestal, even if it recognised we have room to improve, we're still much better than other animals. I saw giving us souls as a manifestation of this. I'm really not criticizing secular humanism as the most practical way or suggesting we go back to an older way that isn't feasible with our current population, I just wanted to point out that we aren't necessarily better off now than we were when we were living in caves - we might be, but you can't take it unquestioned that better technological advancement equates to better lives. I appreciate I'm Straw Manning Pullman a bit with the technology vibe; but it resonates with me when he talks about individuals making the world perfect.

(3) Your point respecting taxation can be easily turned on its head.

Other than the intervening dark ages, we've never got rid of those tax collectors and now we're completely dependent on them and society to look after us.

From whom did the tax collectors derive their authority in Imperial Rome? From whom do they derive their authority today? The distinction you seem to draw between 'society' and 'us' is unsustainable in parallel with your historical argument.

Sorry for the long post, I'm bored at work.

I was getting sloppy; my point was that we used to be able to exist without much government intervention and we didn't want it. Whereas now we require it and defend it.

All in all my conclusions tend to be much more passive than is generally inferred. In a nut shell I wanted to make a distinction between Star Trek humanism versus naturalism without assumptions relating to people. In practical terms it makes sense to consider people important and special, but I find the assumption that we ARE special to be naive and a remnant of Christian thought.

Edit: this is possibly the laziest retort I've made here. There's other stuff I should be doing, and a watertight argument would take too long. You've already accepted the possible delusion of progress which was my main angle. The rest were just poorly thought out examples. The bit I'm interested in is Pullman's Dust and how it separates people from grazers. I think it has an important role in a story that is going to turn Christians into atheists (if that's his goal) - expecting them to leap from people with souls to people being no better than insects would be a harder task so it makes sense as a story device. I just wanted to point out to those who saw His Dark Materials as their new bible, that they may want to consider that we're not so Dusty after all.

Watertight or not, your response floats well enough for me.

The presumption of exceptionalism isn't exclusive to the Christian tradition, but I agree it's an albatross. Perhaps we can forgive Pullman for clinging to the anthropic principle to sway Christians, but I think the sooner we forget it the sooner we can all agree that fighting amongst ourselves is never worthwhile.

This was mostly laziness on my part; I didn't quite refine my arguments completely. I wasn't so much concerned that it was inevitable, but the idea that it was even achievable with enough time is something I would have serious doubts about. Human nature may preclude any such society being possible (the subtext I had in mind is that humans may even need some degree of suffering in their lives for spiritual enrichment and as such the elimination of all suffering may not be feasible or even desirable - the old cliché of people being happy for the mistakes and bad times in their lives for making them the people they are, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless mind yada yada) - sorry for not exploring the argument to its completion but I like generating questions and doubt more than refining my answers. As for the pinnacle, I meant it only in a relative sense when compared with other animals. He definitely portrayed Humans, Mulefa et al. as something special and better than grazers - those who attract Dust and those who don't - I find literally believing in such false divisions to be misguided, but it's OK as part of a story.

This might not be entirely relevant...but thought the point should be suggested:

When reading the books i didn't get the impression that Pullman was portraying humans and mulefa as utterly superior. It seemed to me that their realisation of dust, and its interaction with them was what separated them. It seemed to me that this interaction with Dust was something that could be achieved by any race; The young mulefa attracted no Dust, and were as innocent and carefree as the grazers, though they certainly didnt seem inferior (other than the obvious given that they were youngsters). Humans and mulefa arent 'special' in any way other than that they've found Dust faster than others, they aren't 'chosen' races, to be singled out above all others. The singularity here is Dust, and it is attainable by any race.

(I realise that's not exactly the conventional use of the word singularity, but i couldn't think of the right word , also my arguement probably has holes in it, but its far too early to really be constructing a fortress.)

That essay was a bit of a mishmash. I'm not sure I really followed his argument, to be honest. It seems odd for him to criticise Pullman for owing a debt to Christianity in HDM - the book is based on Paradise Lost, of course it's going to be derived from Christianity.

I'm not sure how the notion of free will is faith-based anyway. Even if it does have its roots in the Christian faith, that doesn't mean that atheists can't take some of these ideas and support them for different reasons. Okay, if you're talking about the issue of free will vs determinism - whether we do in fact have free will, then that's a belief which may never be proved and thus has to be taken on faith. I'm sure this question is addressed somewhere in HDM... But the issue of whether we should promote free will over oppression isn't a factual matter, it's about values. So is he saying that all our values, whether religious or secular, are based on faith? In that case every ethical system is faith-based.

Religions have served many purposes, but at bottom they answer to a need for meaning that is met by myth rather than explanation.

I think the need for meaning is actually one of the issues that Pullman addresses in HDM. What is Dust if not a myth which creates meaning for humanity, and indeed the whole universe? But obviously the difference is that HDM is a work of fiction; it doesn't pretend to be anything more than a metaphor. Whereas religion sets itself up as the truth.

He definitely portrayed Humans, Mulefa et al. as something special and better than grazers - those who attract Dust and those who don't - I find literally believing in such false divisions to be misguided, but it's OK as part of a story.

Yeah, I agree. HDM makes people different from animals - people are special because they have souls (daemons). It's fine as fiction, but most atheists probably reject the distinction.

I found that essay distinctly unimpressive. Perhaps it's partly because I have a bit of a cold, so my concentration is rather on the wane, but it seemed to me to be a disjointed string of non-sequiturs and personal attacks.

I found this bit particularly ironic;

Religion has not gone away. Repressing it is like repressing sex, a self-defeating enterprise.

It rather seems to me that religion trying to repress sex is a rather large contributing factor to the rise of atheism. Which doesn't really prove or disprove his point, but one would think he'd try to avoid reminding his readers of the church's many follies, even if the reminder is on the oblique side. (Very slightly oblique, in this case.)

There also seems to be quite a few paragraphs in which he outlines the opposing arguments, ostensibly to show them up as faulty, but somehow manages to make them seem more reasonable that his standpoint.

A curious feature of this kind of atheism is that some of its most fervent missionaries are philosophers. Daniel Dennett's Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon claims to sketch a general theory of religion. In fact, it is mostly a polemic against American Christianity. This parochial focus is reflected in Dennett's view of religion, which for him means the belief that some kind of supernatural agency (whose approval believers seek) is needed to explain the way things are in the world. For Dennett, religions are efforts at doing something science does better - they are rudimentary or abortive theories, or else nonsense. "The proposition that God exists," he writes severely, "is not even a theory." But religions do not consist of propositions struggling to become theories. The incomprehensibility of the divine is at the heart of Eastern Christianity, while in Orthodox Judaism practice tends to have priority over doctrine. Buddhism has always recognised that in spiritual matters truth is ineffable, as do Sufi traditions in Islam. Hinduism has never defined itself by anything as simplistic as a creed. It is only some western Christian traditions, under the influence of Greek philosophy, which have tried to turn religion into an explanatory theory

Maybe it's my own opinions informing my reading here, but I come out of that paragraph with the information, "The proposition that god exists is not even a theory, and even most of the religious know that it's not. It's only the western Christians who are still misguided enough to think of religion as a valid substitute for science." I don't think this is entirely the reaction he was aiming for.

I would also like to express my agreement with the notion that Abrahamic religion is hardly the patent holder for the notion of free will. Saying that atheism is faith-based because it happens to support a basic idea that religion supports is like saying that Europe and North America are basically the same continent because people on both sides of the Atlantic can do arithmetic. It's just not so.